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I Introduction
The starting point of this paper is a critical examination of Kwasi Wiredu's critique of the correspondence theory
of truth and his preferred theory of truth, a Deweyan pragmatist theory of truth according to which a true claim is one which
is warrantibly assertible from a particular point of view. Wiredu's central claim is that the correspondence theory of truth is
tautologous and thus not a genuine theory of truth. I reject this claim on the grounds that a theory can be judged only in
relation to a working definition and we do not, as of yet, have a working definition of truth. Nor can the correspondence
theory serve as one, as it does not clearly identify a phenomenon to be explained. After contrasting his pragmatist theory of
truth with what I call Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth, in his terminology the realist conception of reality, I argue
Wiredu's pragmatist theory of truth is not a theory of the sort of truth which correspondence theory is talking about because
correspondence theory is a theory of truth full-stop, while Wiredu instead offers a theory of perspective-indexed truth. Then I
argue that if we take the pragmaticist theory of truth as pointing us towards the criteria for truth which we seem to use in
everyday life and in our scientific endeavors, the correspondence theory can be seen to have explanatory power, even
granting that it is in some sense tautologous. In short, while correspondence theory alone might only give what we already
mean when we say "is true," it cannot be our starting point for investigation because it relies on a conception of reality with
no internal criteria for application. Given the pragmaticist theory of truth as a starting point, correspondence theory then
constitutes a theory in the full sense that includes the idea of possessing explanatory power.
II The Critique of the Correspondence Theory of Truth
The correspondence theory of truth says a proposition is true if and only if there is some state of affairs which
corresponds to it; "P" is true if and only if it is the case that P. For example, to say that the proposition "It is snowing in
Tunisia right now" is true means that it really is snowing in Tunisia right now. However, in what sense is this a theory of
truth? It surely is a definition of truth, and one which I am inclined to think does a good job of saying just what we mean
when we say something is true in both science and everyday life. The main thesis of correspondence theory is, in some
sense, a tautology in English, like "All bachelors are unmarried males." Kwasi Wiredu supports this tautology claim by
reflecting on Tarski's logical analysis of truth and the fact that in some languages, such as Akan, there is the same sentence
construction for both "is true" and "is the case" (Wiredu, 36, 48). In other words, "'P' is true if and only if it is the case that
P" in English is tautologous like "All bachelors are unmarried males" because the translation in Akan of "'P' is true if and
only if it is the case that P" is tautologous like "All bachelors are bachelors."
But, as Wiredu says, there are tautologies that expand our knowledge and tautologies that do not (Wiredu, 48).
Why should correspondence theory be one of the former? Here is one suggestion. The correspondence theory is supposed to
be a theory of truth, and a theory must serve to explain some phenomenon. We must, then, have some phenomenon in front
of us before we can go about trying to explain it. Further, we must have some idea of what this phenomenon is which
precedes our theorizing about it to allow us to identify it intersubjectively; I will call this a working definition. To use an
example drawn from Nussbaum, we might want to explain the phenomenon of thunder. Before we can do that, we need a
working definition of "thunder" such as "That noise in the clouds, whatever it is" (Nussbaum, 286). Only once we have
identified the phenomenon at question in some way like this can we debate different explanatory theories about the nature of
this phenomenon. While we might ultimately come to define thunder in a more sophisticated manner, drawing from the
results of the natural sciences, without the background of such a pre-theoretical working definition from which this scientific
account could arise, there would be no sense in which we could say that "the explanatory story citing Zeus' activities in the
clouds is a false account of the very same thing of which the best scientific explanation is a true account" (Nussbaum, 286).
Two people engaged in discourse on which account is superior would simply be talking past each another without a neutral

working definition.
In order to say that correspondence theory is a genuine explanatory theory, then, we would need to have a working
definition of "truth" which precedes it and which identifies a phenomenon that the correspondence theory renders
intelligible. Now, one point which might be made in favor of the correspondence theory as a definition of a concept is its
obviousness. However, judged as an explanatory theory, this actually counts against it. When we want to understand what it
means for a proposition to be true, what is more natural for us to understand by "true" than "corresponds to reality"? The
correspondence theory does not expand our everyday understanding of what truth is because in everyday life we mean
"corresponds to reality" when we say "true." A mere tautology cannot have explanatory power because, being tautologous, it
must already be contained in our working definition. Thus, we may conclude, the correspondence theory, being tautologous,
cannot be an explanatory theory.
There are two problems with this argument. The first problem is that correspondence theory does not serve to
identify a phenomenon. Although the correspondence theory says what we mean by "truth," the role of a working definition
is to act as a criterion. We are not concerned here with meaning. A criterion would help us identify which propositions are
true and for this we must turn to standards of justification. As such, correspondence theory cannot count as a working
definition of truth.
Now, strictly speaking, the conclusion of the argument that the correspondence theory is a mere tautology was that
the correspondence theory must be contained in our working definition. There was no claim that the correspondence theory
exhausts our working definition. We must turn to our second point, that the argument ignores the way in which explanatory
theories feed back into pre-theoretical understanding. When all the lights go out in my room, it is obvious that there has been
a power outage. For an observer not familiar with modern technology, this would count as an explanatory theory. The
obviousness of correspondence theory might plausibly be a result of earlier theoretical insights feeding back into our pretheoretical understanding of the world, such that relative to a more basic working definition of truth it would be explanatory.

III Fallibilism and the Pragmatic Theory of Truth
Even if we reject the argument that correspondence theory must already be contained in our working definition,
this is not sufficient to say that correspondence theory provides a genuine theory of truth. As discussed above, the notion of
an explanatory theory only makes sense relative to a working definition which identifies a phenomenon that the explanatory
theory can be said to explain. We thus find ourselves in the position of searching for a working definition. The starting point
for this search will be to look at alternate so-called theories of truth, though as of yet we have no ground to debate their
merits as theories. Instead, they will be judged both for internal consistency and by the extent that they can be said to identify
the relevant phenomenon (or to point to criteria relative to which they themselves can count as explanations).
Wiredu opposes the correspondence theory of truth to the pragmatic and coherence theories, identifying the former
with Dewey's sense of pragmatism (Wiredu, 37). For the pragmatist, "P" is true if and only if it is warrantibly assertible that
P. For the coherentist, "P" is true if and only if it coheres with our system of beliefs that P. He attempts to reduce these two
definitions to one, claiming that in absence of a more developed conception of "coherence," "[T]he coherence that
conformity to the canons of rational inquiry confers on the cognitions of a rational person may be all the coherence needed"
(Wiredu, 46). These are the same canons that determine whether or not an assertion is warranted, it seems we can identify
the coherence theory of truth with the pragmatic.
While this identification might hold under Wiredu's formulation of the coherence theory of truth, there is a small
but crucial difference between his formulation and standard coherence theory. The coherentist does not say that "P" is true if
and only if it coheres with our system of beliefs that P, but rather that "P" is true if and only if coheres with "that further
whole, all-comprehensive and fully articulated" system of beliefs that P (Blanshard, 268). In replacing "all-comprehensive
system of beliefs" with "our system of beliefs," Wiredu effectively takes coherence theory off the table as well as paving the
way for the perspectival turn he makes later on in his paper. In response to an obvious criticism of the pragmatic theory of

truth, namely that we might've been warranted in saying that, for example, the Sun orbits the Earth at some point in human
history, but not today, and thus the same proposition "The Sun orbits the Earth" would end up both true and false, he
suggests that we must perspective-index – my terminology – our propositions. The revised formulation of the pragmatic
theory of truth thus looks like this: "P" is true from perspective S1 if and only if "P" is warrantibly assertible from
perspective S1 (Wiredu, 44).
There are two important points to make here. The first is that the coherence theory of truth is relevantly distinct
from Wiredu's pragmatic theory of truth. The second is that according to Wiredu's pragmatic theory of truth the concept of
truth full-stop or absolute truth or, as it is more fashionably put, capital-T Truth, drops out from our picture entirely. Or does
it? Against the objection that there are warrantibly assertible propositions that are not true, Wiredu puts forth the frankly
astounding claim that any attempt to show that this is the case would violate fallibilism (Wiredu, 44). It is frankly astounding
because fallibilism, a position defended by C.S. Peirce, is the "doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute" or in other
words that all knowledge claims are in principle subject to doubt and thus might end up being false 1 (Peirce, 1.171). But, this
is to say that I might warrantibly assert something and it might still be false, despite all the evidence presently available to
me being on its side. The very formulation of fallibilism requires truth full-stop, while Wiredu's pragmatic theory of truth is
really only a theory of perspectival truth, or truth right here right now, as opposed to Peirce's absolutely fixed immutable
truth which will be discussed below. Supposing that truth can be cashed out as perspective-indexed warranted assertibility, to
say that all the evidence at present available to me might point towards "P" but "P" might still be false, is to say that "P"
might be true but not true, unless some meaningful difference can be found between “warrantibly assertible that P from my
perspective” and "all the evidence presently available to me pointing towards 'P' being true," such that the latter does not
imply the former.
If this is the case, and if Wiredu does not accept a wider theory involving truth full-stop, in what spirit does he
bring up fallibilism? After all, as he himself notes, perspective-indexing is sufficient to deal with this objection without
invoking fallibilism (Wiredu, 44). It is, I think, to address this dilemma:
If [fallibilism is true], then we can say that the time will, to be sure, can, never come when we shall be in
possession of truths, as distinct from warranted beliefs. Either, then, truth is warranted assertibility or it is a
certified impossibility (Wiredu, 44).
In other words, because fallibilism implies that truth full-stop is attainable only provisionally we must either mean
something other than truth full-stop when we say "truth", namely perspective-indexed warranted assertability, or else we
cannot be said to possess any truths with certainty. The assumption seems to be that any reasonable truth-seeker would
choose the former horn, abandoning truth full-stop, for the sake of being able to say that they certainly possess "truths". To
take the former horn and say that the person who in the 15th Century asserted with warrant that "The Sun orbits the Earth"
said something false, is for Wiredu a violation of "proper epistemological modesty" (Wiredu, 44). By a violation of
epistemological modesty, he seems to understand the identification of a belief that is warranted right here right now with a
truth full-stop.
On this point the Peircean fallibilist would, I think, agree with Wiredu, at least so long as we specify that
unqualified identification of warranted belief with truth full-stop counts as epistemological immodesty. But against Wiredu
the Peircean fallibilist would positively assert that the proposition that the Earth orbits the Sun is provisionally true full-stop
as it is entirely possible, and indeed highly probable given existing scientific evidence, that the claim "The Earth orbits the
Sun" is one of those claims that would end up being continually confirmed if scientific inquiry were to continue on
indefinitely.
Indeed, it strikes me that it is Wiredu here who is in opposition to proper epistemological modesty, not in the sense
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Peirce's fallibilism amounts to much more than this insofar as it is the "principle of continuity" applied to the sphere of knowledge, or
rather insofar as "the principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified," following the Peircean dictum that metaphysics ought
to be based on logic and not vice-versa (Peirce, 1.171, 2.36). In other words, it plays a fundamental role in Peirce's metaphysics which it
would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss.

that his view is a violation of it, but in the sense that his view nullifies the normative force of this concept. To eliminate the
concept of truth full-stop is to eliminate the concept of being mistaken and then correcting it as all "correction" would consist
merely in a change of perspective (excluding those cases where I am unwarranted, even from my own perspective, in
asserting the claims I am asserting). It is at least highly plausible that the virtue of epistemological modesty consists in
equipping us to alter our opinions when faced with contrary evidence and to bring them in accord with reality. Without the
notion of truth full-stop, this virtue has no grip since all perspectives would be on equal footing, none farther from or closer
to truth full-stop, and aside from bringing it into alignment with my own perspective, any change in opinion would be not
but a lateral move. Under these circumstances it is unclear is there is left for the virtue of epistemological modesty to do.
Wiredu seems to be eliminating the virtue of epistemological modesty in the name of the virtue of epistemological modesty.

IV Realism and Nominalism as Theories of Reality
The above largely critical discussion of Wiredu's pragmatist theory of truth avoided our main issue of seeking a
working definition of truth. The reason why Wiredu's account cannot be so regarded will be discussed further below. Wiredu
does bring our attention, however, to the coherence theory of truth and to Peirce's account of truth. Contrary to what Wiredu
suggests, both the coherentist and Peirce in fact accept that the attainment of truth full-stop is not something we can expect to
actually achieve (Blanshard, 270; Peirce, 6.581). Truth becomes, so to speak, an ideal limit point for inquiry which we are
always approaching but never reach. Or, to be more precise, that all-encompassing system (coherentism) or ultimately settled
opinion (Peirce) is an ideal limit point we cannot expect to actually reach. Some of our current beliefs might, however, as a
matter of fact accord with this ideal limit point and as such be true full-stop (Peirce, 7.336 Fn 11).
The two theories are sufficiently similar2 that I will speak for the remainder of the paper exclusively of the
Peircean or pragmaticist theory of truth, "pragmaticism" being the term Peirce coined for his specific version of pragmatism,
in order to contrast it with the nominalistic versions of pragmatism adopted by James and Schiller, which he took issue with
in particular on the point that their theories would render truth or reality mutable (Peirce, 6.485).
Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth can be put as follows: "P" is true if and only if it would accord with the final,
ultimately settled state of inquiry that P. Two things are important to note here. First, the parallel between this statement and
the coherence theory of truth should be clear. Second, Peirce does not put this claim explicitly in terms of a theory of truth.
He tends, rather, to speak of it as a theory of reality. Instead of contrasting the correspondence theory of truth with the
pragmaticist theory of truth, he contrasts what he calls the nominalist and realist conceptions of reality (Peirce, 7.339).
In his use of terminology Peirce is clearly drawing from Francis Abbot's Scientific Theism, a work he greatly
admired (Peirce, 1.20). Abbot argues that we can only know an object by its relations to other objects and as such, by
denying that relations between objects exist independently of the mind, nominalism necessarily implies a Kantian distinction
between mere appearances and unknowable things-in-themselves (Abbot, 4). Peirce maintains that according to the
nominalistic conception of reality, what is real is the external cause of our sensations and, as such, of inquiry (Peirce, 7.338).
This is in clear contrast to realism, the realist conception of reality being that what is real is what would conform to the final,
settled state of inquiry (Peirce, 7.339).
And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that
there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which
alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the
negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that
which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent
of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception
essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase
of knowledge (Peirce, 5.311).
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The similarities between the two conceptions of truth can possibly be accounted for by the Hegelian roots of both theories. Although he
is far from consistent, Peirce at times even declares Hegel a realist (Peirce, 1.19; 4.50). This is high praise, as for Peirce nominalism is
the central error of modern philosophy.

We may say succinctly, for the former conception the real is the external, for the latter conception the real is the
fixed or that which ideally would become fixed in inquiry.
The motives for rejecting the nominalist conception of reality should be clear. By defining the real as the external
full-stop, we would have no means of accessing reality. A gap between inquiry and reality is opened with no obvious way to
leap it besides some sort of epistemological deus ex machina, such as Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas." Or, rather, I
should say the motives for rejecting the nominalist conception of reality by itself should be clear. As Peirce himself notes,
these two conceptions of reality are not contradictory (Peirce, 7.339). We can perfectly coherently regard that which was the
external cause of inquiry as having the dispositional property that it would be believed to exist at the final, settled state of
inquiry.
The motives for accepting the realist conception of reality are, perhaps, more occult. To understand them we need
to understand better what Peirce means by "inquiry". Inquiry is defined simply as the struggle to attain a state of belief as
opposed to doubt (Peirce, 3.74). Although both belief and doubt assuredly have their cognitive components, what is
primarily important here is their emotive and behavioral components. To occupy a state of belief is calm, peaceful (Peirce,
5.372). A belief provides a pattern of behavior which brings along with it a certain smoothness in our interactions with the
world. To occupy a state of doubt, by contrast, is to be uneasy and unsatisfied (Peirce, 5.372). Our doubts gnaw at us. All of
these should be phenomenological facts already known to the reader but it is important to be reminded of them if one seeks
to understand Peirce's conception of inquiry. It is this gnawing sense of doubt, for Peirce, which provides the first impulse
towards inquiry and a process of inquiry can be said to be complete once this doubt has been sated, i.e. once we have been
restored to a state of belief, however this state of belief has been reached.
Two things have to be noted here. First, we must distinguish between a singular instance of inquiry and inquiry as
a whole. Singular instances of inquiry end in the cessation of singular instances of doubt, that is to say, in my establishing a
pattern of conduct right here right now which is fixed for the time being and thus quiets my gnawing sense of doubt, while
inquiry as a whole would end only at the final cessation of doubt, that is, in a belief that never would end up being disturbed.
Second, although there are other forms of inquiry, it is scientific inquiry that we are primarily concerned with and for the
most part when I say "inquiry" I have scientific inquiry in mind. Strictly speaking, scientific inquiry is the only sort of
inquiry which allows us to talk about truth or reality (Peirce, 5.384). This is because scientific inquiry is the only form of
inquiry in which we can talk about making mistakes (Peirce, 5.385). The other forms of inquiry are all subjective, either in
the sense that they make the individual person's opinions or tastes the standard or the individual state's or authority's. This is
a problem because the fact that other people (or peoples) hold different beliefs from ours is, or at least can be, a cause for
doubt (Peirce, 5.378). As such, we need independent standards of justification in order for inquiry as a whole to be a
consistent (albeit impossible) project. Given these independent standards, it makes sense to talk about the final, settled state
of inquiry, such that we can identify the world determined by such an ideal state (reality in the realist sense) with the
external world (reality in the nominalist sense). As for why we should call what is determined by this final, settled state
"reality" in the first place, the Peircean response seems to be that otherwise reality would be unknowable in a way that could
not even ideally be overcome. After all, we would have no impulse to inquiry supposing we had reached this final, settled
state, any beliefs at this final state having survived all possible doubts. We can be said to know reality to the extent that our
current state of belief approximates this unreachable ideal 3.

V The Explanatory Power of the Correspondence Theory of Truth
The starting point for this paper was Wiredu's argument that the correspondence theory of truth is tautological and
thus not a true theory. As a definition of the English word "truth," of what we mean by "truth" in everyday life and in
3

It is important to note that, while Peirce primarily has in mind empirical science here and while he does think that all scientific claims
have to be verifiable by observation, his notion of both verification and observation are much broader than that of the logical positivists.
For example, Peirce is willing to say that both modern mathematics and scholastic philosophy engage in "observations" in the requisite
scientific sense (Peirce, 1.34). What is important is not that the observations be of empirical objects, but that general claims be checked
against particular instances and by a community of inquirers.

science, it might be good but it is not a true theory, we suggested, because it does not have explanatory power. An argument
for this claim based on the idea that the correspondence theory, being tautologous, must already be contained in our working
definition was rejected on the grounds that theoretical results often come to be ingrained in our everyday conceptions.
Further, the correspondence theory appears insufficient to serve as a working definition unless we can identify a
phenomenon which it renders intelligible. In what followed, Wiredu's own preferred theory of truth, the pragmatic theory of
truth, was contrasted with Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth or realist theory of reality which is similar to the coherence
theory of truth.
Although the discussion of the pragmatic theory of truth was generally critical, we did not definitively reject it. But
we have two grounds for definitive rejection: The first, internal, ground is that Wiredu's claim that the correspondence theory
is tautologous leads him into trouble; his pragmatic theory is a theory of truth from some perspective or another whereas
what it is supposed to explain is truth as defined by the correspondence theory of truth, which is truth full-stop. Wiredu finds
this definition of truth unhelpful and tautologous. But if, as Wiredu says, correspondence theory is tautologous, then the
pragmatic theory cannot conflict with it without violating the conditions of meaningfulness. The correspondence theory and
Wiredu's pragmatic theory conflict extensionally because they yield different conclusions when applied to the same
propositions. "The Earth orbits the Sun" is not a proposition which is either true or false on Wiredu's theory of truth but it is
on the correspondence theory. It might be true and false on Wiredu's theory depending on which perspective is presupposed,
e.g. "The Earth orbits the Sun from perspective S1 and not perspective S2."
The second, external, reason to reject the pragmatic theory is that it cannot be an explanatory theory as it cannot be
a working definition of truth because it only serves to identify the phenomenon of warranted belief, not of truth, which is
what we wanted to explain. This point can be made succinctly by noting that when an assertion that is made with warrant at
one point and is then shown to be unwarranted on rational grounds when we take on a new perspective, we say that we
merely thought it was true rather than that it was true from that perspective and is false from this one. Naturally in saying
this I am relying implicitly on a working definition, albeit one that is not yet formulated. It would be more precise to say that
the pragmatic theory of truth is not a formulation of our working definition for the reasons cited above.
Turning now to the pragmaticist theory of truth, if we consider it an explanatory theory we run into the same
problem. We still do not have a working definition (or at least we have not found a way to formulate it). The question then is
whether the pragmaticist theory serves as a working definition that allows us to engage in explanatory theorization. To do
this it must identify the phenomenon which we wish to explain when we go about trying to come up with an explanatory
theory of truth. I want to suggest that it does identify this phenomenon, albeit in an indirect way. The definition of truth as
what would accord with the ultimately settled state of inquiry does not directly identify a phenomenon. Insofar as the
ultimately settled state of inquiry is a merely ideal state, it does not refer to any actually existent reality at all. It does,
however, turn our attention to certain general facts of experience, in particular, the fact that certain beliefs tend to be
confirmed over and over again, while others are falsified. To use an everyday example, it is constantly confirmed that my
chair supports my weight. The pragmaticist theory of truth turns our attention to these everyday examples, as well as similar
examples in the sciences, such as the Earth's orbiting the Sun, as examples of truths while likewise cautioning us that the
identification of these beliefs with truth full-stop is always provisional, thus respecting epistemological modesty without
eliminating the normative force of the concept
Having suggested that the pragmaticist theory of truth formulates our working definition of truth, we can now ask
ourselves if the correspondence theory can be regarded as a genuine theory of truth relative to it. Again, I want to suggest
that this is the case. After all, should it not strike us as strange that certain beliefs keep getting confirmed? Why should this
be the case? Why should it not be the case that one belief gets confirmed at one moment and its opposite the next? The
strangeness of this state of affairs, and our corresponding state of doubt, is resolved by the supposition that these beliefs that
keep getting confirmed are ones that fit with some reality external to us, a reality more or less stable and outside of our
control. Thus, the correspondence theory of truth counts as a genuine explanatory theory. We may sum up this theory as
follows: those beliefs which settle down (are continually confirmed) do so because they correspond to a mind-independent

reality and thus the course of experience, ultimately deriving from those objects, does not challenge them. Put in Peircean
language, reality in the realist sense is identified with reality in the nominalist sense.

VI Conclusion
My conclusion is then roughly the opposite of Wiredu's. Wiredu supposes that the correspondence theory is the
sort of tautology that does not expand our knowledge. This is certainly true in the sense that we find ourselves already
having internalized it, but not in the sense that it is not a genuine explanatory theory. An explanatory theory can be judged
only in relation to a working definition that identifies the phenomenon at question. The correspondence theory, having no
clear criteria of application, cannot serve as such a working definition. Moreover, adopting as our working definition the
pragmaticist theory of truth which I believe does the best job of the theories available of identifying, albeit indirectly, the
phenomenon we wish to explain, we find that the correspondence theory does in fact explain why certain beliefs get
continually confirmed while others are falsified. In short, the pragmaticist theory provides criteria while the correspondence
theory says what we mean by "truth" and has explanatory power. It is only when we take the correspondence theory for
granted, as we are inclined to do because it is so ingrained into our language and everyday life, that it appears trivial. Not all
tautologies are uninformative, as Wiredu himself says (Wiredu, 48). He is simply mistaken in thinking that the
correspondence theory is one of them4.
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Even granting that this proposal makes sense in English, we might worry about its translation into other languages. After all, the reason
that Wiredu gives for thinking that correspondence theory is tautologous is not that "'P' is true if and only if P is the case" in English is
like "All bachelors are unmarried males" but rather that its translation into Akan is like "All bachelors are bachelors." However, it is
important to note that "All bachelors are bachelors" is only tautologous in the sense that it doesn't expand our knowledge if we mean the
same thing by "bachelor" both times it occurs. In fact, given what we have just said about the realist and nominalist conceptions of
reality we might justifiably say that "'P' is true if and only if P is the case", where P is the assertion that some concrete particular x
exists, means that "x is real if and only if x is real" but here that is not a tautology because the first instance of "real" means reality in the
nominalist sense and the second instance of "real" means reality in the realist sense. "'P' is true if and only if P is the case" as we mean
it here only comes out uninformative tautology in Akan if "P would be believed at the final settled state of inquiry if and only if P
corresponds to the mind independent world" also comes out an uninformative tautology.

